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Unfamiliar allies: Australian cross-cultural communication in Afghanistan and Iraq 





During the war on terror, Australia became engaged as a military-alliance partner in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In both wars, these commitments were relatively small-scale and 
Australians were primarily engaged as subordinate elements of larger coalition formations. 
Australian soldiers had to manage the obvious challenge of linguistic and cross-cultural 
communication with unfamiliar Afghan and Iraqi allies, but linguistic and cross-cultural 
communication problems were also significant in relations with Western coalition allies. 
Despite surface commonalities, Australians found that the troops they worked with from the 
United States and the Netherlands had noticeably different military cultures. In the Iraq war, 
the American commitment to a whole-of-nation struggle engaging large numbers of regular 
troops, reservists, National Guard, and civilians was significantly different to the low-level 
Australian deployments, and challenges emerged both from the management of American 
expectations, and from everyday Australian interactions in an ultra-patriotic American 
military culture. Conversely, Australians in Afghanistan worked with the Dutch, an 
unfamiliar western ally whose liberal social values and consensus/discussion-based military 
culture differed from Australian military expectations. This chapter will explore the social 
history of Australian military communication with allies in the war on terror focusing on 




Former Australian soldier Shane Bryant quickly found transition to war in Afghanistan as a 
contractor had its cross-cultural challenges. ‘The other dog handlers and I were travelling on 
what the Americans call Space-A - space available transport. I was starting to learn a whole 
new language and Space-A, translated, meant low priority. Uniformed American personnel 
got top billing, arranged by rank, and coalition soldiers and airmen were next. At the bottom 
of the heap were the civilian contractors like me.’1 
Australian military2 language, like any other, has adopted lexical components over 
time as Australians have engaged in cross-cultural communication with a wide variety of 
military partners.3 Adoption of various expressions can arise because of exposure over time, 
a practical desire to use commonly understood terms to simplify communication, or it can 
relate to a value placed on specialist language. Before the First World War, British military 
language and style were valued. The phrase all Sir Garnet, a shortening of ‘it’s all Sir Garnet’ 
meaning everything is all right, was a tribute to a very competent, late-Victorian British 
General Sir Garnet Wolsey, but it is now almost unknown.4 Some terms from Australia’s 
long military association with British India have endured: every day sick Australian soldiers 
arrive at a military medical centre to see the medic or the doctor and are given a chit (Indian 
army slang for a small piece of paper) excusing them from duty or stating what medical 
restrictions they have. Dhobi is a term for washing, while a puggaree (decorative cloth band) 
still adorns the Australian Army slouch hat. Other terms still in use reflect Australian military 
deployments to Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Solomon Islands, and Bougainville. In his 
Afghanistan war memoir, Nathan Mullins notes the use of makan (Indonesian Malaysian 
term for eating), vui tui (small plastic leaflet book, from the Vietnamese for small photo 
album), and em tasol (South Pacific pidgin for that’s all, everything is finished).5 The 
survival of such terms is tribute to the enduring significance of cross-cultural communication 
in military environments. 
                                                          
1 Shane Bryant with Tony Park (2010), War Dogs: An Australian and His Dog Go to War in Afghanistan (Sydney: 
Macmillan), p. 51. 
2 I use the term military to refer to troops or soldiers, as in members of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. 
3 For a detailed exploration of a range of these terms, see Amanda Laugesen (2005), Diggerspeak: the 
Language of Australians at War (Melbourne: Oxford University Press). 
4 Richard Fotheringham (2009), ‘Speaking a New World: Language in Early Australian Plays’, Journal of the 
Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association, 111, pp. 1-20, here p. 5. 
5 Nathan Mullins (2011), Keep Your Head Down: One Commando’s Brutally Honest Account of Fighting in 
Afghanistan (Sydney: Allen and Unwin), pp. 80-81. 
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The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provided opportunities for further linguistic and 
cross-cultural exchange. In both wars, Australian military commitments to an area 
collectively known as the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO)6 were relatively small-
scale and Australians were almost always deployed as subordinate elements of larger 
coalition formations where they were compelled by circumstances to interact with different 
military cultures.  
The past decade has seen a growth in the examination of warfare from the 
perspectives of language and communication, notably in the work of Footitt and Kelly.7 This 
chapter contributes to this scholarship on language, while also building on earlier scholarship 
addressing the way individual memoirs reveal the experience of war, such as the 
contributions of Woodward and Jenkings.8 It examines accounts of Australians who 
participated in two recent conflicts to trace instances of cross-cultural communication. There 
is a rich vein of scholarship examining the memoirs of participants in recent conflicts,9 but 
research on the Australian experience is still in its infancy. During the war on terror 
Australians served with Iraqis, Afghans, Italians, Canadians, and Singaporeans among others, 
but this chapter will explore the social history of Australian military communication with 
their US and Dutch allies. This research is based on selected personal accounts10 that reveal 
how participants understood and experienced cross-cultural communication in war, and 
positions these accounts beside news reports, as well as the author’s personal experiences in 
Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006-07 and 2008-09. 
The deployment to the MEAO meant Australians had to address two specific issues of 
communication, interpreting, and translation in war, one relating to the locations of the wars 
and the other to the allies they worked with. Firstly, a common feature in both deployments 
was that the local populations spoke languages (primarily Arabic or Pashtun) that most 
                                                          
6 The term MEAO encompassed Australian military activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in bases 
and on ships throughout the Arabian Gulf, but the focus of this chapter is on Iraq and Afghanistan. 
7 Hilary Footit and Michael Kelly (eds) (2012), Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace 
Building (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan). 
8 Rachel Woodward and K. Neil Jenkings (2012), ‘”This Place Isn’t Worth the Left Boot of One of Our Boys”: 
Geopolitics, Militarism and Memoirs of the Afghanistan War’, Political Geography, 31:8, pp. 495-508. 
9 Synne L. Dyvik (2016), ‘”Valhalla rising”: Gender, Embodiment and Experience in Military Memoirs’, Security 
Dialogue, 47:2, pp. 133-150; Lamberta Hendrika Esmeralda Kleinreesink (2017), On Military Memoirs: A 
Quantitative Comparison of International Afghanistan War Autobiographies (Boston, MA: Brill); Julien 
Pomarède (2018), ‘Normalizing Violence through Front-line Stories: The Case of American Sniper’, Critical 
Military Studies, 4:1, pp. 52-71. 
10 While uniformed members of the military dominate this study, defence civilians and former members of the 
military also form part of this group of Australians attempting to communicate with allies during war. 
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Australians were unfamiliar with. This lack of familiarity complicated Australian interaction 
with their allies in the Iraqi and Afghan security forces, the sometimes neutral civilian 
population, and also their insurgent enemies. Such unfamiliarity meant use of interpreters was 
essential and even with such mediation, linguistic interaction with local nationals could be 
obscured by differences. Cultural differences between Australians, Iraqis, and Afghans 
provided further communication challenges. Secondly, a common feature of both 
deployments was that the stated mission language was English, the majority language of the 
United States and a widely spoken second language of the Netherlands, and this might have 
been supposed as eliminating communication difficulties. But despite linguistic 
commonalities between Australia and the United States there were some challenges of 
communication, interpretation, and language and even greater differences emerged between 
Australians and the Dutch. 
The experience of Australian communication with allies in the two theatres of war 
varied to a tremendous degree. For younger or junior-ranking Australians who might never 
have travelled overseas, never worked with people from another country, and who lacked 
exposure to different cultural practices, deployment with the US or Dutch military could 
provide a significant culture shock. For those meeting Americans for the first time, this 
culture shock might perhaps have been partially alleviated by the ubiquitous presence of 
American popular culture in the Australian mass media. But the fictive media version of the 
United States differed from the reality.11 Other more experienced Australians had well-
developed prior understanding of their future coalition partners. Before serving as a senior 
commander at the United States headquarters in Iraq in 2004-05, Major General Jim Molan 
had practical exposure to working with the Americans on joint military exercises, giving him 
a real understanding of American military culture.12 Unlike the accounts of other soldiers, his 
memoir rarely dwells on matters of cross-cultural communication. 
 
Trying to communicate with the locals in an unfamiliar world: Language mediators 
 
                                                          
11 Richard Gehrmann (2017), ‘Enemies of the State(s): Cultural Memory, Cinema, and the Iraq War’, in Jessica 
Gildersleeve and Richard Gehrmann (eds), Memory and the Wars on Terror (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 
69-89. 
12 Jim Molan (2008), Running the War in Iraq (Sydney: HarperCollins), pp. 23-24; 40. 
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While the focus of this chapter is on linguistic and cross-cultural communication with 
Australia’s Western coalition allies, this needs to be considered in the context of the degree of 
isolation and social distance that could be felt by those engaged in linguistic and cross-
cultural communication with Afghans and Iraqis. Tone and intensity could aid in 
communication but spoken words might be unintelligible, as infantryman James Prascevic 
discovered when he walked into potential danger from sniper fire in Baghdad—‘I was yelled 
at by an Iraqi soldier and although it was in his language, I knew that he was telling me 
off.’13 Operating in a linguistically and culturally unfamiliar environment, the Australian 
Defence Force worked to reduce problems by deploying military members who had native 
fluency through their own migrant heritage, by training troops without native language 
background in the challenging languages required for the Middle East deployments, and by 
employing contract interpreters. Unfortunately, despite a large and diverse immigration 
program, Australia did not have a vast supply of military-grade Iraqi, Arabic, and Afghan 
language speakers. The Australian military was unable to recruit many migrants with native 
fluency in these languages,14 a factor in part explained by structural and language issues15 
and a natural reluctance of those who have migrated from war-torn countries to join the 
military or have their children join the military. 
The Australian Defence Force School of Languages at Point Cook supported military 
deployments by conducting year-long courses, three-month courses, and month-long courses 
in a range of languages,16 and some Australians were given specific language training in 
Arabic and in the Afghan languages Pashtun and Dari. Previous Australian deployments to 
Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands required instruction in Indonesian/Tetum 
(Timorese) and variants of Pidgin English, and trainees could gain a degree of competence in 
these languages in a limited study time. Very basic communication could be achieved in a 
very short timeframe, as infantryman Paul de Gelder found out when his completion of a two-
                                                          
13 James Prascevic (2014), Returned Soldier: My Battles: Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, Depression and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (Melbourne: Melbourne Books), p. 92. 
14 This is despite specific targeting of this group. See Anthony John (2013), ‘From Institution to Occupation: 
Australian Army Culture in Transition’, Australian Army Journal 10:3, pp. 187-202, here p. 191. 
15 Hugh Smith (1995), ‘The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force’, Armed Forces & 
Society, 21:4, pp. 531-51, here p. 12. 
16 See Issares Surachestpong (2016), ‘A Needs Assessment of Intensive Language Teaching at the ADF School of 
Languages’, PhD thesis, Victoria University. 
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week basic Tetum course and the fact that nobody else could speak Tetum resulted in him 
becoming his platoon’s translator.17  
The languages required for Iraq and Afghanistan were more difficult to learn, and in 
the case of Arabic training for the Iraq deployment, one of the complications was that there 
are extensive variants of Arabic throughout the Arab world. In both wars there was a reliance 
on contract interpreters although the Australian Defence Force was engaged in competition 
for international trained interpreters with the United States, the primary end user for 
interpreters. These (mostly male) interpreters ranged from native-born speakers who were 
American citizens to local nationals who were often university-educated young men taking 
considerable risks by operating unarmed in a war zone. These urban-centric tertiary-educated 
interpreters also had to deal with the challenge of living and working in what for them were 
harsh conditions in rural areas, and the significant risks of combat. Despite their unarmed 
status, there were instances of interpreters using weapons. For example, in January 2009 one 
interpreter working with Australians training the Afghan National Army (ANA) was caught 
in an ambush and responded to the crisis by using a weapon captured from insurgents to fire 
at the opposing Afghan insurgents, before using his language skills ‘to motivate the ANA in 
the rear squad,’18 forms of ‘cross-cultural communication’ which were highly appreciated by 
the Australian soldiers he was working with. But there are limits to what interpreters could do 
to bridge gaps. Given that Australians were in war zones where they experienced a high 
degree of social distance and isolation from the unfamiliar local people, it would be 
anticipated that Australians would gravitate towards United States or Dutch soldiers whose 
culture on the surface appeared to be so much more familiar.  
 
Working with Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan  
 
Australian military engagement in the MEAO covered specific phases and locations. A small 
Australian force entered Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban in 2001, and following this, 
small numbers of Australian troops were located at Kabul’s Kandahar airfield (KAF), and 
                                                          
17 Paul de Gelder (2011), No Time for Fear (Camberwell: Penguin), p. 93. 
18 Ben Gooley, Matt Lines, and Tom Larter (2012), ‘OMLT – in contact’, in Dave Allen (ed), War in the Valleys: 




eventually 1,500 were deployed in 2006 at Tarin Kowt in the southern province of Uruzgan. 
In 2003, a small number of Australians participated in the invasion of Iraq, and in the 
subsequent reconstruction phase a small number of Australians were posted to staff, logistics, 
and air traffic control positions in the capital city Baghdad, in the Green Zone of central 
Baghdad, and at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). A security detachment (SECDET) 
was maintained to protect the Australian Embassy in Baghdad and further troops were sent to 
train the new Iraqi army. Between 2005 and 2009, Australia had a 500-strong task force in 
the southern provinces of Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar. With the exception of the Dutch-run 
Uruzgan province, Australians were principally located near Americans. 
Australia and the United States are English-speaking, Anglo-dominated, multicultural 
nations sharing many common cultural links, both through historical experience and through 
more recent globalisation, so it might be presumed that wartime cross-cultural 
communication problems would be rare. As allies through the ANZUS treaty and other 
military pacts, Australians conducted routine military exercises with Americans, and 
personnel from both nations served in reciprocal exchanges. Australians have previously 
fought alongside Americans in the Second World War and in Vietnam, and have a history of 
cooperation. However, the American Iraq and Afghanistan war commitment to a whole-of-
nation struggle engaging large numbers of regulars, reservists, National Guard, and civilians 
was significantly different to the small-scale Australian deployments. Indeed, when Jim 
Molan first arrived in Iraq in 2004, he noted that while the entire coalition of predominantly 
United States troops numbered 175,000, he was one of only 311 Australians in Iraq.19 
Challenges emerged both from the management of American expectations and from everyday 
Australian interactions in an ultra-patriotic American military culture. As a subordinate 
partner, Australians understood American military language and communication processes, 
frequently adopting lexical aspects of the American military, and despite some differences 
cross-cultural communication problems were generally overcome. 
The United States was fighting a high-intensity war in which year-long repeat 
deployments were common. David Savage, an Afghanistan-based defence civilian working 
on aid projects (who was to subsequently be wheelchair-bound with significant brain and 
spinal injuries following a child suicide-bombing attack) recalled the experience of one of his 
security detachment, a twenty-three-year-old American. This soldier was on his fourth 
                                                          
19 Molan, Running the War in Iraq, p. 310. 
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deployment to the Middle East, having previously served on two tours to Iraq and one to 
Afghanistan, a not uncommon story that reflected the very high deployment rate that was just 
part of the American war experience.20 While the number of Australians deploying on 
multiple occasions increased over time, unlike their American allies, few undertook repeated 
twelve-month tours of duty. 
Australian troops arriving in the MEAO had to adjust their expectations of 
Americans. For many in the Australian military, the Australian heroic representation of the 
Vietnam War experience21 had created a perception that Australians had a much greater 
warfighting ability than the Americans. Jim Molan recalled, ‘Since I had joined the army, 
almost every story I had heard from my superiors and every account I had read concentrated 
on the deficiencies of our powerful friend. I believed that US soldiers were certainly brave 
but far from competent … We spoke of how the US lost the Vietnam War, not how “we” lost 
the Vietnam War.’22 The experience of being on the sidelines in Iraq23 and of performing a 
less significant role in Afghanistan than Commonwealth allies Canada or Britain meant this 
perception of Australian superiority required some modification.24 
 
American culture, and uses of language 
 
Troops arriving in the MEAO had already received briefings on Iraqi or Afghan culture 
during their pre-deployment training in Australia. On arrival in staging locations in the 
Arabian Gulf such as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates Al Minhad base, they could also 
be given further briefs on cross-cultural adjustment—in this case on adjusting to Americans, 
as allies they would be working and living with. 
                                                          
20 Paul Field (2017), Gimme Shelter: Stories of Courage, Endurance and Survival from the Frontline and Back 
Home (Richmond: Echo), pp. 6-7. 
21 Graeme Dobell (2014), ‘The Alliance Echoes and Portents of Australia’s Longest War’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 68:4, pp. 386-96, here pp. 288-289. 
22 Molan, Running the War in Iraq, pp. 23-4. See also Gary McKay (1998), Delta Four: Australian Riflemen in 
Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), pp. 215-223. 
23 Jim Hammett (2008), ‘We Were Soldiers Once: The Decline of the Royal Australian Infantry Corps?’, 
Australian Army Journal, 5:1, pp. 39-50. 
24 On occasions in Iraq, the British actually thought Australians were reluctant to become engaged in combat. 
John Blaxland (2014), The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 241-242, pp. 246-247. For a comparison of the Canadian and Australian deployments see Kim Nossal 
(2009), ‘Making Sense of Afghanistan: The Domestic Politics of International Stabilization Missions in Australia 
and Canada’, International Journal, 64:3, pp. 825-42. 
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These briefs were designed to reduce tension between Australian and US troops, and 
to increase mutual understanding. Topics included the risk of causing offence by disparaging 
very distinct American values and religiosity. Shane Bryant worked as a contractor with the 
United States military in Afghanistan, and viewed Americans positively but observed cultural 
differences. He recalled: ‘They were generally friendly and polite, and I had already picked 
up that many were overtly religious compared to Australian soldiers. It wasn’t unusual to see 
guys saying grace before they ate.’25 Australians were warned about American attitudes of 
hierarchy and respect, and their high degree of ultra-patriotic loyalty in comparison to 
Australia's more casual and iconoclastic culture. Another topic to be avoided was the low 
American pay and allowances in comparison to the high Australian service allowance, 
although infantryman James Prascevic noted that some ‘did say that it would be great to be 
on the sort of money we were but for them it was all about representing their country. 
Whenever I asked the question, “why did you join up?” most of the time the answer was 
“9/11.” They were so proud of their country and the fact that they could represent it 
overseas.’26 Regardless of whether they voted Republican or Democrat, the US President was 
their commander-in-chief and was accorded significantly more respect than Australian Prime 
Ministers were, and public Australian speech with Americans had to be adjusted accordingly. 
The American propensity to wear unusually short haircuts, so-called ‘high and tight’ haircuts, 
and to spend hours in the gym weight lifting also distinguished them from Australians. A 
number of Australians were embedded in predominantly American coalition headquarters, 
and the requirements to understand American cultural norms posed a daily challenge for 
them, a cross-cultural challenge that was far less pressing for their fellow Australians based 
in the large all-Australian deployments in Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar in southern Iraq. 
Respectful language and the use of profanity was a further cultural difference. While 
in private everyday speech military conversations between ordinary American soldiers could 
range from polite to explicitly coarse,27 in public or official interactions the American 
military exhibited a high degree of political correctness in relation to appropriate language 
use and unacceptable behaviour. This was taken to what Australians could see as extreme 
lengths. All troops in the Middle East were lectured on the requirement to drink enough 
water, and a basic test individuals could perform on themselves was to check that they had 
                                                          
25 Bryant, War Dogs, pp. 62-3. 
26 Prascevic, Returned Soldier: My Battles, p. 83. 
27 For examples of this see Evan Wright (2005), Generation Kill (London: Corgi), and Chris Kyle (2012), American 
Sniper (New York: Harper). 
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clear rather than dark yellow urine two times per day. The American public-advisory slogan 
was a circumspect ‘be clear twice a day’ while the very direct Australian version was ‘piss 
clear twice a day.’ Political correctness and circumspection was also reflected in the language 
that could be used in public gatherings. Award-winning stand-up comedian Tom Gleeson has 
described his experiences undertaking a concert tour to the Middle East in 2006,28 where he 
performed his highly amusing musical parody of British artist James Blunt’s song ‘You’re 
beautiful’ to mixed Australian and American audiences. Having comprehensively trashed the 
character, life, and music of Blunt, Gleeson concluded this segment of his performance with 
the words ‘James Blunt, rhymes with c[un]t.’ Americans would visibly recoil in horror, 
complaints would be made, Gleeson’s public relations minders would tell him not to do it—
and of course he did it again in the next performance! 
American military culture regulated aspects of the interaction between males and 
females. While both militaries had rules prohibiting inappropriate sexual contact or 
fraternisation, Australians were accustomed to a more relaxed level of everyday interaction 
between males and females, and found American restrictions unusual. When transiting 
through US staging bases in Middle Eastern countries for short periods, Australians were 
accommodated on stretchers in large hangar-sized temporary sleeping tents. As guests, 
Australians were obliged to adhere to American requirements that dictated males and females 
sleep in separate tents, despite the fact that the male sleeping tent might be crammed full to 
overflow and the female tent might only be occupied by half a dozen soldiers. In such 
circumstances, Australians in transit would have been comfortable sleeping in the same 
location regardless of gender. This is not to imply that United States rules of public behaviour 
protected Australian 29 and American women30 from unwelcome sexual attention. There was 
a difference between the prescribed rules and the actual realities of everyday life, especially 
in an environment where women were a minority. Some female Americans experienced rapes 
by male soldiers. Signals officer Sarah Watson commented that the gender imbalance and her 
                                                          
28 Tom Gleeson (2008), Playing Poker with the SAS: A Comedy Tour of Iraq and Afghanistan (Sydney: University 
of New South Wales Press). 
29 There have been significant changes in the Australian Defence Force since a highly publicised sex scandal in 
2011. See Jessica Carniel (2017), ‘Death and the Maiden: Memorialisation, Scandal, and the Gendered 
Mediation of Australian Soldiers’, in Jessica Gildersleeve and Richard Gehrmann (eds), Memory and the Wars 
on Terror (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 237-62, here pp. 251-55. 
30 See, for example, the memoir of Kayla Williams (2005), Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in 
the US Army (London: W. W. Norton & Company). 
11 
 
obviously foreign status made her stand out: ‘It did add an unwanted pressure. I got hit on 
quite a bit by the Americans in the mess. They were just blatant.’31 
Cross-cultural differences also included ethnic diversity and public affirmation of 
such diversity. The vast US armed forces that deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan were far 
more ethnically diverse than the much smaller Australian military, with significant numbers 
of Americans from minority communities, including African-Americans, Hispanic-
Americans, and Asian-Americans. This diversity was reflected in public celebratory aspects 
of US military culture. For example, in Baghdad Australians eating at the DFAC (Dining 
Facility or mess hall) occasionally encountered posters, singers, musicians, and food 
celebrating the diversity of America for events such as National Hispanic American Month or 
Korean American Day. Such public displays of national multiculturalism surprised many 
Australians who had presumed the United States to be far more monocultural. There are no 
similar Australian celebrations, despite Australia’s ethnic diversity. 
Australians on a US base would usually have their meals in an American-run DFAC. 
They would be offered a varied array of typically American food where high-fat and high-
sugar options appear to dominate, but there was enough choice to ensure that the food was 
still acceptable to Australian tastes. However, even just going to eat was a daily experience of 
linguistic and cross-cultural engagement. Troops entering the DFAC had to produce their ID 
card and often submit to being greeted by the armed soldiers on guard with the distinctively 
American ‘Hooah’ call, a call Americans would reply to with the same word as an antiphonal 
response. Australians would usually only respond with that term if they were deliberately 
making fun of the DFAC guards, or they could alternatively respond with a purposefully 
clichéd ‘g’day mate,’ which over time could lead to the DFAC guard being subtly ‘retrained’ 
to use this greeting for Australians. 
 
Borrowing of United States military language  
 
As well as cross-cultural adjustment, more formal acculturation of Australians towards the 
American language of war came with the wholesale adoption of a range of US military 
terminology by Australians serving in the Middle East. This occurred both because of the 
                                                          
31 Paul Field (2017), Gimme Shelter, p. 228. 
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functional or practical requirements to match the dominant military partner and use a 
common pattern of spoken and written military behaviour, but also because use of such 
language was a marker of veteran expertise and legitimacy. By using American Middle East 
military terms, individual Australians demonstrated status and experience of having served in 
the sandpit or the sandbox, rather than a benign and therefore lower-status peacekeeping 
mission such as East Timor or the Solomon islands.  
Functional or practical terms were official acronyms and expressions that simplified 
communication. The author’s recollection of terms included TIC (‘tick,’ troops in contact), 
TOC (‘tock,’ tactical operations centre), DFAC (‘Deefack,’ mess hall), MSR (main supply 
route), CSH (‘Cash,’ combat surgical hospital), IED (improvised explosive device), 5 and 25s 
(search pattern) for IEDs, and YPOC (‘Whypock,’ yellow palm oil container possibly re-used 
and filled with explosives for an IED). Different people were referred to as LN or local 
national (a citizen of Iraq or Afghanistan), TCN (third country national and usually a 
contractor from the Global South), and terp (interpreter). The name for the enemy in each 
country varied over time. The acronym AIF (anti-Iraqi forces) was problematic for military 
Australians accustomed to associating these letters with the venerated Australian Imperial 
Force of the First World War, so it was a welcome change when the term INS (insurgents) 
became standard. 
T walls were the thick concrete blast walls commonly used to protect troops in Iraq 
from rocket attack or small-arms fire, whereas in Afghanistan HESCO gabions (wire mesh 
containers filled with gravel) were common. A prisoner was a PUC (‘puck,’ person under 
control). Nouns could of course also have their verb form, as the following exchange would 
indicate: ‘Did they bring a PUC in with them?’ – ‘yes—actually they pucked two guys in the 
last raid.’ In United States headquarters, operations staff officers were referred to as battle 
captains and battle majors. This was a practice followed by Australians in the national 
headquarters or who were embedded in coalition headquarters, despite the fact that there was 
a clear disjuncture between actual fighting in a battle with a weapon, and the role of a staff 
officer performing an equally significant, but far less heroic, task of fighting the war with 
Powerpoint. 
Of course, unofficial United States military slang terms were also adopted. Battle 
rattle referred to complete military equipment, including body armour, and a pogue was a 
derogatory term used by infantry to refer to everyone else. FOB (‘fob’) was an official term 
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that stood for Forward Operating Base which was a large secure military base occupied by 
Fobbits, those whose jobs did not take them into areas of risk outside the wire, which meant 
the only risk they faced was IDF (indirect fire), usually from rocket or mortars. The Green 
Zone in Baghdad was the slightly safer area around the embassies and national headquarters 
in central Baghdad, which one would reach by travelling along Route Irish from Camp 
Victory, the main US base located at Baghdad International airport (BIAP) on the edge of the 
city. Confusingly, in Afghanistan, the Green Zone was not safe but was the potentially very 
dangerous cultivated and inhabited area located along a river valley. While many Australians 
knew a few Arabic (shukran thank you) or Pashtun (tashakor thank you) phrases, the greatest 
source of loan words was the most dominant power in the MEAO, the United States military. 
 
Working with the Dutch in Afghanistan  
 
Although some Australians were based in Kandahar and Kabul, the majority of Australians in 
Afghanistan worked with the Dutch at Camp Holland in the southern Uruzgan province under 
the auspices of NATO, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Despite 
being fellow members of the Western alliance, the Dutch were a relatively unfamiliar ally 
with no recent history of shared military cooperation with Australia. While a small number of 
Australians had fought with the Dutch against the Japanese, Second World War military 
cooperation with the Dutch was minimal and the post-war Australian military occupation of 
Indonesia did not improve Australian-Dutch relations. For soldiers serving together in the 
twenty-first century, the lack of past military cooperation exacerbated existing cultural 
differences. 
The Netherlands was a more open and progressive social culture than Australia and 
this was reflected in aspects of their military communication and practice. During the years of 
military cooperation in Uruzgan province between 2006-10, it became apparent that Dutch 
liberal social values and consensus, and the Dutch discussion-based military culture, differed 
from that of Australia. Even Dutch food was different, as was their propensity to wear 
spandex tights while exercising. Despite military cooperation in war and the high levels of 
English spoken by Dutch soldiers who were far more linguistically talented than their 
Australian counterparts, a degree of distance remained between the Dutch and Australian 
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military, and Dutch military terminology did not become part of the Australian military 
lexicon.  
Small numbers of Australian Special Forces deployed to Afghanistan in 2001-02 and 
again in 2005, but large-scale regular army deployments only began in 2006. The primary 
Australian commitment in Afghanistan was the contingent serving as part of Task Force 
Uruzgan from 2006,32 which marked perhaps the first long-term33 Australian deployment in 
which Australians served under non-English-speaking operational command. While service 
under American command had seen the adoption of American military terminology, 
Australian troops in Afghanistan only adopted Dutch terminology on rare occasions. The 
Task Force was Dutch-led, but over time comprised elements from a variety of countries 
including Australia, France, Norway, Singapore, Slovakia, Britain, the United States, and also 
Afghanistan. Visiting journalist Chris Masters observed that in the Dutch-run mess, ‘Each 
national force tends to keep to their respective tables; neither openly warring nor 
enthusiastically bonding, the Task Force Uruzgan allies assume a posture of armed 
neutrality.’34 
 
Dutch culture, and uses of language 
 
The Dutch were proud of their relaxed military culture, which even included casual parade 
behaviour on ‘formal’ parades, and their casual military style was apparent in their physical 
appearance and dress. The rituals of standing to attention and at ease were far more easy-
going than those of the Australian military. A comparative study of military culture has 
revealed the Dutch military have been perceived as being independent, sociable, flexible and 
informal, loose and impertinent, but also as comradely and competent.35 Like some of their 
other European counterparts that Australians shared a military base with (Italians in southern 
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Iraq, French and Slovakians in Afghanistan), the Dutch had a more relaxed attitude to 
haircuts and shaving. In military circles, there was a significant degree of prestige in the 
beards Special Forces soldiers grew, but European beards were often more fashionable and 
tailored. In the words of Australian Major Rachel Brennan: ‘You’d see them around the gym 
or eating in the mess hall. They’d have long hair. Some of them had mohawks. They’d get 
around in their lycra get-up. Just different. We thought they were a bit more loose than how 
we ran things. They’d come around in normal vehicles and not armoured vehicles. They had 
a different approach to things.’36  
Dutch national characteristics of consensus and discussion were also part of Dutch 
military culture. This became readily apparent to Australians (such as the author of this 
chapter) who regularly worked with the Dutch. Getting to know the Dutch well on a daily 
basis over eight months provided a different perspective on their unique approach to military 
issues, their genuine commitment, and their very quirky sense of humour. But events that 
Australians expected to be formal military meetings could be marked by a high level of open 
discussion, informal critique, and ambivalent responses, which to some Australians appeared 
to be unprofessional, leading to cross-cultural misunderstanding and stress.37 This is 
somewhat paradoxical because it has been argued that the Australian military prides itself on 
a culture of egalitarianism and informality, values that developed in response to the rank-
conscious pomp and hierarchy of the British military,38 and the open discussion and informal 
criticism implicit in Special Forces culture is universally admired. However, military 
Australians posted to mainstream conventional units prefer formality and more rigid styles of 
behaviour, and were uncomfortable with an ally whose soldiers could talk and discuss 
military issues so openly—and even join trade unions. 
It has been argued that this perception that the Dutch are tolerant and non-martial is 
incorrect, and Zaalberg has claimed that ‘the cliché of the Dutch as a traditionally peace-
loving, non-militaristic and culturally sensitive people’ was in fact at odds with actual Dutch 
military practice in Afghanistan which could be highly kinetic.39 This reality was also noticed 
by some Australians. According to Lieutenant Colonel Jason Blain, ‘A lot dis the Dutch as 
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soft and weak. I tell you my experience is they focused on getting out there and achieving 
results. An interesting lot who don’t want to be seen so much as professional soldiers.’40 
The Australian Defence Force’s strict no-fraternisation policy restricting sexual 
contact between fellow soldiers seemed bizarre to Dutch soldiers. Conversely, Australian 
soldiers presumed high levels of fraternisation took place among the Dutch. But this was just 
one of many cross-cultural differences. The Dutch had unisex showers, something which for 
many Australians seemed to confirm all their deepest suspicions of European behaviour, and 
the image of Dutch males in the gym was problematic. The practice of wearing lycra or 
spandex tights without the modesty shorts that were mandatory for Australian soldiers was so 
offensive to Australian soldiers that a Facebook page emerged to conduct discussion of the 
‘problem.’ 
Norms of political correctness was another area where cross-cultural challenges 
emerged. In this sphere Dutch practices seemed to be the opposite of American practices. 
While Americans were more likely to be highly religious and were overtly so in public 
displays, the Dutch were overtly secular and as well as a military chaplain they had a non-
religious equivalent. The Dutch were quite happy to joke and make reference to sexual issues 
in a far more open manner than their Australian counterparts. Australians were also genuinely 
shocked by the Dutch Christmas tradition of Sinterklaas and Zwarte Piet (St Nicholas and 
Black Peter), during which some Dutch soldiers dressed as Christmas elves in blackface 
makeup. 
Dutch culinary culture also seemed foreign to many Australians. On Wednesdays, the 
Dutch-run mess hall in Camp Holland served Indonesian-style curry dishes, an element of 
Dutch cultural traditions based on the Dutch colonial experience in the East Indies,41 but 
Blauwe hap or Rijsttafel never entered Australian military terminology. Another Dutch 
military tradition was to have a seafood brunch on Sunday mornings, which gave many 
Australians what may have been their first exposure to Dutch rollmops or raw pickled herring 
fillets rolled into a cylindrical shape around a filling. This was not a culinary trend that was 
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greatly admired by the non-Dutch military personnel at Camp Holland,42 and there were 
protests about Dutch catering. The complaints about Dutch food eventually reached the Chief 
of the Australian Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, who admitted to a 
government committee that while the Dutch food was ‘generally nutritious,’ ‘the issue is that 
it’s not Aussie food, it’s European food.’43 
Crisis situations could exacerbate cross-cultural difficulties on both sides. After taking 
part in a helicopter extraction of two wounded Dutch soldiers from the battlefield, combat 
medic Terry Ledgard had his life-saving treatment of one Dutch soldier challenged by a 
Dutch trauma nurse when he accompanied his casualty into the Dutch run hospital in Tarin 
Kowt. He described her angry responses to his treatment of the casualty leaving him feeling 
‘disoriented in a Bermuda Triangle vortex of unfamiliar Dutch culture, hostility and 
situational pressure.’44 
 
Borrowing from other languages in Afghanistan 
 
A very small number of Netherlands military terms became part of the Australian military 
vocabulary, reflecting the broader limitations to cross-cultural understanding. The very 
practical NATO 9 liner was used as it was the standard casualty-report form. Other generic 
military terms were acquired because of the particular nature of the training task in southern 
Afghanistan. An example is the term omelette, from Operational Mentor and Liaison Team 
(OMLT), referring to a small group of Australian or other ISAF soldiers used to mentor and 
train the Afghan National Army soldiers.  
Geographically significant Afghan terms such as the dasht (desert area) and quala 
(compound) slipped into regular military usage, as did shura (the Arabic term for meeting, 
used in both Iraq and Afghanistan). Another term that made the transition from the Iraq war 
to Afghanistan was jundi, the Arabic term for soldier that in Afghanistan was applied to any 
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male in Afghanistan.45 Infantryman Kyle Wilson, like many Australian soldiers, used Afghan 
words in the battlefield and these words find their place in soldiers’ memoirs of events 
leading up to an imminent battle: ‘I had a bad feeling he was a bad cunt and we followed him. 
I yelled out ‘Waderaja’ (stop) but he ignored me.’46 However, Afghan languages rarely 
permeated Australian military consciousness, and did not become part of standard Australian 
military slang. Unlike Australian soldiers based in France from 1915 to 1918, most 
Australians were deployed to Afghanistan for fixed periods of up to eight months rather than 
several years, and did not spend rest and relaxation time in the company of a supportive local 
population. During their deployment to Afghanistan, they lived apart from the civilian 
population in secure military camps and patrol bases when not on patrol, and thus had limited 
opportunity to interact in everyday manner with the local civilian population. Troops 
mentoring the Afghan National Army who were posted to promote patrol bases alongside 
Afghan soldiers had greater contact with soldiers and of necessity learnt more Afghan terms, 
but this contact became more constrained as ‘green on blue’ killings (killing of a coalition 
soldier by a rogue Afghan soldier) increased in the later years of the Australian deployment. 
 
Analysis of the Australian experience of communication in Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
American expressions dominated both wars, which is unsurprising given the vast number of 
deployed US troops, the influence the United States has on global culture, and their 
superpower status. There are various possible reasons why Dutch military terminology did 
not become part of the Australian military lexicon. The very fact that the United States were 
the coalition leaders during the war on terror since 2001 gave the United States primacy, and 
would have made it difficult to any other linguistic military culture to have displaced that of 
the United States. A further explanation could be that the linguistic differences between 
Dutch and English meant that Dutch usage of terms was not readily apparent to many 
Australians, limiting the likelihood of the adoption of non-English terms. It should also be 
emphasised that the Dutch are a talented and educated multilingual people, and large numbers 
of Dutch military personnel spoke English, further limiting the transmission of Dutch military 
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language to the Australian lexicon. English was after all the mission language and a global 
language—and Australians did not need or bother to learn Dutch, so had fewer reasons to 
pick up Dutch vocabulary.  
Another reason might relate to Australian perceptions of their own status as fighters 
and of their perceptions of the status of the Dutch as fighters. Australians perhaps liked to see 
themselves as being closer to the more warlike Americans and far removed from the 
ostensibly less warlike and consensus-driven casual Dutch, whose much-praised counter 
insurgency policy of civil-military cooperation47 appeared to some Australians to be a soft 
approach. A series of dismissive Australian comments on the much more significant 
Netherlands military presence in Uruzgan adds weight to this possible explanation. American 
perceptions that their NATO allies were not doing enough to support the fighting effort led to 
the American joke that the acronym ISAF (word on the sleeve of Dutch troops) stood for ‘I 
saw Americans fighting.’ It is ironic, in a situation where Australia actually had a 
disproportionately smaller military involvement in Afghanistan than the United States, that 
this American joke was adapted by Uruzgan-based Australians into ‘I saw Australians 
fighting.’ Mullins recalls the snide explanation that ‘Dutch’ stood for the phrase ‘don’t 
understand the concept here,’48 and Masters observed that Australian soldiers had another 
apparent explanation of the international country abbreviation for the Netherlands (NLD), 
this being that it stood for ‘no one likes Dutch.’49 There have been Australian claims that the 
Dutch did not provide enough support for Australians.50 Counter to this and despite 
Australian presumptions of their own warlike nature, it should be noted that there had also 
been instances of Dutch claims that Australians refused to support them in battle, because of 
more restrictive Australian rules of engagement.51 This issue of who was the most warlike is 
not the focus of this chapter, but the key point might lie not so much with the reality of 
Dutch-Australian military cooperation, but in the Australian perceptions of this cooperation. 
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The perception of Australian military superiority would have also puzzled the 
Americans when the Dutch left in 2010. Despite having more troops in Uruzgan than other 
nations, the Australians insisted on being under American command (Combined Team 
Uruzgan) until 2012, to avoid the political cost of provincial leadership. This chapter does not 
explore what allies thought of Australians in Iraq and Afghanistan, but a Lowy Institute 
publication titled ‘inconsequential confused and timid’ is telling.52 In his evaluation of 
alliance relations in the Iraq war Jim Molan noted that ‘The British called us “the new 
French” and the US saw us as just another ally that needed to be carried. The Americans are 
far more polite than the British.’ Such comments bear out the assessment that Australian 





In conclusion, the Australian military experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are of interest in 
terms of the study of Australian military culture. Australians faced the challenge of engaging 
in cross-cultural communication and linguistic exchange with English-speaking and non-
English-speaking allies, and significant differences existed in different cases. This chapter 
has explored the social history of Australian military communication with allies in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and shows that the tradition of borrowing language during war 
continues, but it also suggests that the global power of English, plus the status of the United 
States as a major ally that Australians interact with on a regular basis, has meant that the 
United States has been the dominant linguistic source for Australian borrowing of foreign 
military terminology in the current era. It also demonstrates that despite apparent cultural 
similarities, cross-cultural differences meant that communication between allies could be 
problematic. Based on the Canadian experience, Brian Selmeski has pointed out that cross-
cultural competence in war needs to go further than better briefings, additional language 
training, knowledge of the enemy, and knowledge of international relations.53 Understanding 
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the ways in which ordinary members of the military understand cross-cultural communication 
with allies will do much to advance understanding and shape future experiences. Past 
research shows cultural diversity in multinational force operations can be the source of both 
weakness and strength,54 and the likelihood of future service in coalition operations makes 
examination of past practice significant.  
Australians in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan adopted a range of terms from their 
allies. The adoption of such insider terms occurs for a variety of reasons. It can be based on 
an admiration of another military culture, or can reflect the impact a dominant military 
culture has had on a subordinate military culture, with the duration of time cultures have been 
in contact with each other also being a factor. A further consideration is that soldiers want to 
adopt what become ‘military chic’ expressions in order to take on the representation of real 
soldiers, presenting themselves as experienced and well-travelled warriors. Using terms and 
language acquired in the war zone denotes experience and can provide the user with insider 
status, becoming the mark of the veteran. 
Australians served in the war on terror after the Australian government’s decision to 
commit to these conflicts as a military-alliance partner in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both wars, 
Australian commitments were relatively small-scale and Australians did not seek an 
autonomous role but remained engaged as subordinate elements of larger coalition 
formations. The Australian military had to manage the obvious challenge of linguistic and 
cross-cultural communication with unfamiliar Afghan and Iraqi allies, but linguistic and 
cross-cultural communication problems were also significant in relations with ostensibly 
more familiar coalition allies.  
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